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Especially young, innovative and fast growing firms have to invest in substantial
resources before they achieve a viable market position. However, the new firm’s equity
position is very weak and debt financing is often restricted. Institutional private equity
investors are supposed to make an important contribution by closing the funding gap of
those firms. Those investors, well-known as venture capitalists, often provide more than
finance to their portfolio firms to table with other shortcomings of young firms. Both
types of support imply a positive impact on growth rates of the venture-backed firms. 
Up to now there’s no empirical study for Germany which deals with the analysis of the
effect of venture capitalists’ and other investors’ involvement in young, innovative and
fast-growing firms on their growth. This paper is concerned with the empirical testing of
some hypotheses about venture capitalists’ role for German new firms’ growth. The ZEW
Foundation Panels are the database for the analysis. The definition of venture-backed
firms is based on inquiries for investment activities of venture capitalists in newly
founded firms in the database recorded. The econometric approach of this study allows
the control for two possible sources of selection. One selection concerns the fact that new
firms’ growth is unobservable for some observations. A second selection results from the
decision of a venture capitalist to finance only high potential firms. Both selection
problems are often not or only partly considered in previous studies. However, the
estimation results emphasize that ignoring both selection problems leads to biased results.
Surviving venture-backed firms achieve significant higher growth rates due to financial
involvement and services provided by venture capitalists. Contrary to the expectations,
the impact of venture capital on new firms’ growth does not differ between high-tech and
low-tech industries. Moreover, venture capitalists are more able to push the firms to a
faster and higher growth than other investors during the time of the venture. At the
moment the number of venture-backed firms in Germany is very small. The demonstrated
positive impact is supposed to make a contribution to an increasing adoption of venture
capital finance as an additional financial resource for young firms with a high potential of
growth when financial constraints are obvious.The Impact of Venture Capital on Firm
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Abstract: The financial and non-financial involvement of venture capitalists is
supposed to be positively correlated with firm performance. This paper deals with
the evaluation of the impact of venture capitalists on employment growth of new
founded firms. Differences between high-tech and low-tech industries as well as
the impact of other investors are analyzed. The estimation results show that
surviving venture-backed firms realize higher growth rates compared to surviving
non-venture-backed firms. Moreover, venture capitalists are more able to push the
firms to a faster and higher employment growth than other investors.
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1  Introduction
Many policy makers and entrepreneurship scholars regard high-tech start-ups as
driving forces for economic growth, job creation and structural change. The
successful realization of the founders’ idea is a necessary condition for the expected
positive impact of start-ups. The probability of firm’s success depends on the
existence of growth supporting factors and the elimination of growth obstacles.
Financing is one of the most critical obstacles of new firm growth (Moore 1994,
Berger and Udell 1998). Binks and Ennew (1996) show that younger and growing
firms suffer more from credit constraints than older and non-growing firms. New
firm’s equity position is very weak and debt financing is often impossible or
restricted (Sitglitz and Weiß 1981). The higher risk of failure of young innovative
firms and missing tangible assets as collateral leads to credit rationing by lenders
with the result of a funding gap. 
Private equity investors are supposed to make an important contribution by closing
the funding gap for young, innovative firms. Investments in young firms with a high
growth potential are a special part of private equity activities and are well-known as
venture capital finance. Venture capital also plays a crucial role in the financing and
commercial exploitation of new technologies. Kortum and Lerner (1998) found
venture capital funding has a positive impact on the number of patented innovations
using industry- as well as firm-level data. However, not only high-tech firms
received venture capital. Firms in low-tech industries are also financed with venture
capital (Gompers 1999). The crucial criterion for venture capitalists to invest in
young firms is the expectation of growth of those investments. This growth is
regularly based on a unique selling proposition. 
The adoption of venture capital as an additional financing resource is immediately
associated with the existence of profitable exit option for venture capitalists. The
most attractive possibility of divestment typically is public offerings (Amit et al.
1998). This fact and a lot of US-success stories imply a greater attention by2
government in nearly all European countries to push the growth of venture capital
industry in the last decade. Beside a lot of law regulations, the most prominent
activity is the introduction of special segments for growth companies at various
stock exchanges in Europe in recent years. The German “Neuer Markt”, as the most
prominent example, started in 1997 at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Early stage-
financing rose dramatically as a consequence: The amount of new early stage
investments jumped from € 93 million in 1996 (13,3 per cent of all new
investments) to € 1,652 million in 2000 (34,7 per cent of all new investments)
carried out by members of EVCA2 in Germany (EVCA 2001). 
Venture capitalists monitor business activities of their portfolio firms and often
provide additional services beside the financial involvement to close the gap in
managing non-technical shortcomings (Amit et al. 1998, Berger and Udell 1998,
Gompers and Lerner 1999). The role of venture capitalists offers some advantageous
conditions for the growth of venture-backed firms. A lot of recent studies examined
empirically the relationship between receiving venture capital and firm performance
(see Schefczyk 2000 for an detailed overview). Sapienza (1992) found that the
provided services are positively related to the performance of venture-backed firms.
Jain and Kini (1995) show that venture-backed firms publicly offered at stock-
markets have a higher cash flow and sales growth. Lerner (1999) evaluates the long-
run success of firms participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program, a major public assistance initiative in the United States for high-
technology firms. Those receiving assistance from SBIR achieve significantly higher
employment and sales growth rates than similar No-SBIR assisted firms between
1983 and 1995. These differences are even more pronounced in ZIP codes with high
venture capital activity. Manigart and Hyfte’s (1999) findings for 187 Belgian
venture-backed firms are quite different. Belgian venture-backed firms do not
                                          
2 EVCA is the abbreviation of The European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association. The
Association’s mission is to globally promote and facilitate the development of the European
private equity and venture capital industry (EVCA 2000). 3
achieve a significant higher employment growth compared to non-venture backed
firms of the same industries, of similar size, and similar age. However, higher
growth rates in total assets and cash flow are obvious. Buergel et al. (2000) do not
observe any significant effect of venture capital finance on firms’ sales and
employment growth. Their multivariate analysis of the determinants of firm growth
is based on a questionnaire of 500 German and British high-tech start-ups. 
Most of recent studies compare venture-backed firms with those that received no
venture capital at all based on the consideration of few important firm characteristics
that may influence the probability of receiving venture capital and the propensity to
grow. It follows from this that the estimated impact of venture capital is potentially
biased. Hence, the study uses an econometric selection approach to estimate the
mean impact resulting from receiving venture capital. The approach allows to
control two possible sources of selections. The first one results from the decision of
venture capitalist to finance only firms with a high potential of growth. The second
one controls for the availability of suitable information to carry out the analysis
about the mean impact of venture capital. Furthermore, this paper picks up the
discussion about two other relationships. Some authors argue that venture capitalists
are more able to push the firms than other investors (Amit et al. 1998). Others
emphasize that venture capitalists’ contribution is dependent on new firms’
innovation level (Timmons and Bygrave 1986, Sapienza 1992). 
This study is structured as follows: I derive some hypotheses about the impact of the
involvement of venture capitalist on new firms growth in chapter 2. Chapter 3 deals
with the econometric specification of the model in order to test for hypotheses. the
empirical analysis of impact of venture capital finance on new firms’ growth is
based on data from the ZEW-Foundation Panels. Comments about the identification
of venture-backed firms in the database are given in chapter 4. Estimations results
and their discussion are presented in chapter 5. The main results are finally
summarized in chapter 6. 4
2  Hypotheses 
Berger and Udell (1998) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) emphasize three reasons
why venture-backed firms outperform non-venture-backed firms: pre-investment
screening, monitoring and value adding. Entrepreneurs seek financial resources and
offers projects to venture capitalist. Venture capitalists make expectations about the
net cash flow R  of their investment which is determined by project quality q,
entrepreneur’s effort e and provided services s. According Amit et al. (1998) the
return V to the investor given monitoring and services is 
( ( , ), , ) ( | )       VR e m q s I s M m s    
with  as venture capitalist’ share on firm and net cash flow, I the sum of venture
capital investment, s the provided services and m as monitoring cost. Because
providing services make it cheaper to monitor the firm, monitoring cost M at a given
level s with  (| 0 ) M ms m  are considered instead of m. 
In the first stage (pre-investment screening), projects whose expected return E(V) is
above a minimum value are selected. Venture capitalists’ assessments of
entrepreneur’s effort and project quality as critical variables are based on criteria for
successful ventures (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984). Firms with such criteria have a
higher probability of receiving venture capital. For firms not meeting those criteria,
a lower potential of high growth is assumed. Only 5 per cent of all offered projects
are financed with venture capital (Gebhardt and Schmidt 2001).
The decline of the financial constraints with the investment by the venture capitalist,
the monitoring activities and the provided services in the second stage (investment
stage) indicate a positive impact on firm performance in venture-backed firms.
Monitoring the entrepreneur combined and control rights help to reduce moral5
hazard problems and stimulate entrepreneur’s effort on the one hand.3 Provided
services (e.g. advice, adding reputation, etc.) increase entrepreneur’s skill to manage
obstacles on the other hand. All this positively determines the net cash flow and
therefore the return V. Following from this:  
  Hypothesis  1:  Venture-backed firms perform better than non-venture-backed
firms as a consequence of the involvement of venture capitalist. 
A higher risk of insufficient market acceptance of new products at the market entry
leads to more attention, monitoring the business activities of innovative firms and
provided services by venture capitalists or other investors. Given a positive
relationship between provided services and the performance of the portfolio
company, the impact on firm performance is supposed to be larger in firms with a
high innovation level. Sapienza (1992) found that the venture capitalist’ role in
portfolio companies increases with the innovation level of the firm related to
competitors. The amount of provided services and monitoring may also associate
with the differentiation between high-tech and low-tech industries.4 Typically
innovative high risk projects have a greater variance as non-innovative low-risk
projects (Sitglitz and Weiß 1981). Almus et al. (1999) show that growth rates of
firms in high-tech manufacturing have a greater variance than other manufacturing
firms. Therefore, the hypothesis seems to be testable on the level of industries and
is: 
  Hypothesis 2: The impact of venture capital is greater for firms in high-tech
industries compared to firms in low-tech industries. 
                                          
3  Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the increase of  leads to more non-pecuniary benefits
consumed by entrepreneur which negatively affect the firm’s value. However, it can easily be
assumed that monitoring and control mechanism reduce the consumption of those benefits.
4  The hypothesis is tested on the aggregated level of industries because information about the
firm’s innovation activities are not available in the database. 6
Links to external non-venture capital firms may provide additional know-how or
capital as well as networks with customers or suppliers. Closing the funding gap and
knowledge transfer through linkages to other firms determines the new firm’s
growth positively. However, this governance model may also have some negative
impacts on new firm growth. A strong dependence on the decisions of external firms
can potentially hinder new firm’s development. Sahlman (1991) points out that this
fact is especially distinctive if approval processes within larger enterprises are not
fast enough and the entrepreneur is less motivated due to the absence of sufficient
equity participation. However, it can easily be assumed that positive effects of
involvement are supposed to dominate the possible negative effects and therefore: 
  Hypothesis 3: Integrating in external firm’s network positively determines the
new firm’s development.
Venture capitalists have a comparative advantage in selecting good projects and
dealing with existing information asymmetries compared to other investors (Amit et
al. 1998, Gompers and Lerner 1999). Furthermore, venture capitalists are more
profit-oriented. Therefore, they have an interest in a fast commercial success and
growth of their portfolio firms. Against them, objectives like increasing market
power and market acceptance of products by strategic ventures in newly established
firms are more important for other external firms as investors. Jeng and Wells
(2000) point out that only venture capitalists can really successfully provide the type
of corporate governance that new firms need. In contrast to that new firms with
involvement of external firms may have a better access to suppliers and customers.
External firms offer the access to their own network. In comparison to that venture
capitalist provide links to potential suppliers and customers only as intermediary.
However, last mentioned advantage does not exceed the advantages by the
involvement of venture capitalist, hence:7
  Hypothesis 4: The involvement of venture capitalists leads to a higher impact on
new firms’ early growth, compared to the impact resulting from the involvement
of other external firms as investors. 
3  Econometric approach 
Figures concerning turnover variable has no missing values only in 38 per cent of all
cases in the database. In contrast, employment are available for 80 per cent of all
firms. Recapitulating, employment growth rates are calculated for testing the impact
of venture capital finance on new firm growth.5 The minimum requirement for
calculating growth rates is the existence of employment numbers E at least at two
different points in time t1 and t2  tt 12   . Due to the varying inquiry dates, the firm-
specific growth rate  i G  is calculated as an annual average growth rate with a
minimal time interval of six months between the two inquiries.6 This paper deals
with the impact of venture capital finance on new firm growth. Therefore t1 has to
be recorded in a maximum interval of twelve months after the firm’s foundation.
The calculation of the growth rate follows Evans (1987), assuming an exponential
growth trend.7 Thus, for all N1-firms fulfilling the requirements, the firm-specific

















                                          
5  According to Hart (2000) the limitation of employment as measure for size is not important,
because all size measures are highly correlated across firms.
6  Biannual data deliveries (waves) by Creditreform, which contain updated information on
previously surveyed firms and information about firms recorded in the meantime, guarantee as
many changes of the recorded data as possible. 
7 Alternatively, a constant growth trend can be assumed. However, for analyzing average
employment growth based on N1-firms with consideration of positive and negative growth
rates, the error is lower in case of assuming an exponential growth trend.8
Evaluating the impact of venture capital for firms in high-tech and low-tech
industries and the comparison with the impact of other investors leads to the
following specification of the growth equation: 





























































































Vector G in equation (2) contains the employment growth rates of N1-observations.
Vector VC and Vector EF are the determinants of interest in this study. VChigh-tech
(VClow-tech) contain the values one/zero if a firm in high-tech (low-tech) industry
receives venture capital in early stage or not with  () VC VC high tech low tech 
  as the
parameter estimated. EFhigh-tech and EFlow-tech contain the values one/zero if another
external firm takes a share in a firm after its foundation. I define early stage
investments as investments of a venture capitalist or of another external firm in
firms no more than three years old. Certainly, the use of firm’s age is only an
approximation of actual stage financing. However, a longer distance between
foundation date and begin of involvement make it more difficult to take into account
the initial founding characteristics as crucial determinants for firm growth. 
The matrices X and V contain some critical determinants (e.g. firm size, age, legal
form, team foundation, firms’ environment) for firm growth (see Hart 2000 for a
detailed discussion). Matrices Xhigh-tech, Xlow-tech include exogenous variables under
the assumption that their impact on growth varies between high-tech and low-tech
industries with the parameters high-tech,  low-tech. Vector V contain remaining
variables which impact does not differ between high-tech and low-tech industries.9
Equation (2) can be estimated by using a linear regression model (Evans 1987) when
the vector of the error term u has the expected value zero and the variance  u
2.
Results for determinants of interest can be biased if a potential selection exists. Two
possible selection problems are identified: selection biases deriving from the
observations  2 N without growth rates and selection biases deriving from the pre-
investment screening procedure of investors. The first one is controlled by using the
sample selection approach developed by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974).
Missing values in the calculated growth rate can be attributed to the inquiry
procedure used by Creditreform. Firms with a large amount of business activities,
fast growing and rapidly declining firms are surveyed more often than other firms.
Moreover, voluntary liquidations often remain unnoticed by Creditreform for a long
time  (see Almus et al. 2000 for further explanations). The endogenous variable  i S  is
a Bernoulli-distributed random variable and takes the values one/zero if a growth
rate can be computed or not. The first selection problem leads to the following
specification of the selection equation:
' VC EF SV C E F Z v     (3)
The selection biases deriving from the pre-investment screening procedure of
investors are considered with the use of the predicted probability of an early stage
investments by a venture capitalist or other external investors. Evaluating the impact
during the time of venturing is only possible if effects resulting from the pre-
investment screening procedure are excluded. Investment activities of venture
capitalists and other investors are based on predictions of the growth potential of
firms and therefore “endogenous”. Growth potential of firms is determined by firm-
specific, management-specific characteristics and firm’s environment. Those are
considered in vector WVC and WEF, respectively. Therefore, two involvement
equations are specified to consider the second selection problem:
'   VC VC VC VC W u   (4a)10
' EFE F E F EF W u   (4b)
One selection and two involvement equations make a trivariate probit model
necessary. However, the complex structure hinders the use of a maximum-likelihood
estimator. Therefore, a simplification is done so that two bivariate probit models are
estimated separately. The first bivariate probit model contains the equations (3) and
(4a), the second one include the equations (3) and (4b). Correlation between the
error terms of involvement equations (4a and 4b) are ignored with the simplification. 
Summarizing, the first model contains equations (2), (3) and (4a) to evaluate the
impact of venture capital for new firm growth. The second model includes equations
(2), (3) and (4b) to estimate the impact of linkages to other involved external firms
for new firm growth. The consideration of potential selections derived from the
observations  2 N without a growth rate and selection problems derived from the
endogeneity of investor’s investment decisions lead to the following variance matrix
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An extension of Heckman’s selection approach from an univariate selection to a
bivariate selection is necessary for the estimation of  eu  and  ev   in both models. The
models can be estimated by using a two step procedure (Reize 2001). Firstly, a
bivariate probit model is estimated to calculate the nonselection hazards, referred by
Heckman (1979) as the inverses of Mill’s ratio  u  and  v   (see Table 6). Here, the
involvement and the selection equations are estimated simultaneously. In the second
step, the two inverses of Mill’s ratio are included in the growth equation as
additional exogenous variables and new equation is estimated by using a linear
regression model. This procedure is done for the first and second model separately. 11
Moreover, I take into account the endogeneity of the involvement variables VC and
EF in the selection equation (3) in accordance with Almus (2001). Hence, I estimate
both bivariate probit models to generate the linear predictions
'   and   ' VC VC VC EF EF EF WuWu    for using instead of the indicator variables VC and
EF in the selection equation: 
,, (' ) (' ) ' VC VC VC VC S EF EF EF EF S
SS






After that I estimate both bivariate probit models again and calculate the Mill’s
ratios for growth equations. 
,, VC EF VC u u VC v v GV C E F X V               (6a)
,, VC EF EF u u EF v v GV C E F X V               (6b)
The identification of  ,  and  VC VC S   , (  and   resp.) EF EF S    is guaranteed if vector W
includes at least one variable which is included neither in vector X or V and if the
joint distributional assumption of the error terms is correct (Heckman et al. 1999).
The two step procedure produces consistent estimates, however the standard errors
are inconsistent. Therefore bootstrapping of standard errors is used to get consistent
standard errors (Reize 2001).
4  Definition of venture-backed firms
This firm specific data in the ZEW Foundations Panels has been provided by the
largest German credit rating agency “Creditreform” since 1991. Almost all firms
registered in the trade register enter Creditreform’s database. In contrast, the entry
probability of unregistered firms depends on the scope of their credit demand and of
their business relations to other firms. The Creditreform database contains details on
shareholders and the liability status of natural and legal owners of firms. The12
identification of venture-backed firms is based on a computer-assisted search for
names of venture capital companies as shareholders recorded by Creditreform up to
January 2001. All venture capital companies that are private equity investors which
have a full member status of European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or
German Venture Capital Association e.V. (BVK) are considered (EVCA 2000, BVK
2000). Associate members are not taken into consideration because their business
activities focus on management support. Additionally, members of U.S. National
Venture Capital Association with activities in 1999 at the U.S. venture capital
market (VentureOne 1999) and other well-known venture capital companies are
considered (Luedke et al.  2001). Finally, funds of venture capital companies are
included in the database and a search for key words like “Venture Capital”, “Private
Equity” is done to identify firms with obvious venture capital activities. 
The limitation of the study is that ventures with a silent partner are very difficult to
observe based on Creditreform data, because silent partnerships concern the
relationship between two or more partners inside a firm and are not recorded in the
trade register (Jacobs and Scheffler 1998). However, exclusively silent partnerships
don’t play an important role in early stage financing of profit oriented venture
capitalists. Firstly, managerial support is directly connected with financial
involvement of venture capitalists in young, innovative firms (Betsch et al. 2000).
Entrepreneurs of new firms demand additional non-technical managerial support
provided by venture capitalists on the one hand (Lessat et al. 1999). The high risk of
failure and the considerable information asymmetries in young firms compared to
later stage firms lead to above hands-on management by venture capitalists on the
other hand. Those activities are very difficult to organize by silent partners with
restricted control and information rights in firms. Silent partnerships in young,
innovative firms are supposed to be suitable only in addition to the involvement of13
other investors for closing the remaining funding gap.8 Secondly, silent partnerships
are less suitable to realize a risk-equivalent profit. A silent partnership allows only a
limited participation in firm success. However, only a small share of venture-backed
firms are very successful. A sufficient compensation of venture capitalists’ efforts in
very successful and less successful early stage projects is only possible if venture
capitalists participate proportional on the book value of successful firms. 
A comparison of the findings with information provided by BVK depicts the
potential of the ZEW Foundation Panels for analyzing the impact of early stage
financing by venture capitalists (Engel 2001b). 1,074 start-ups founded between
1991 and 1998 in Germany received venture capital and are part of the group of
venture-backed firms.9 Table 2 shows some of their characteristics. As expected,
firms in high-tech industries are more often financed by venture capital than firms in
other industries. 38 per cent of all ventures-backed firms are established in high-tech
industries. Venture capitalists prefer firms with high growth potential. Such firms
are more often found in high-tech industries. The importance of venture capital is
still very low on average, but varies dramatically between the sectors. 1.22 per cent
of all 10,331 new firms in R&D intensive manufacturing are part of the group of
venture-backed firms. The lowest proportion of venture-backed firms is to be found
in retail trade and construction/energy. Only 0.04 per cent of all new firms are
financed with venture capital in those sectors. Firms with an innovative product or
unique selling proposition are very rare in low-tech industries. Venture capitalists
prefer an involvement with limited liability. In case of firm failure, only the amount
invested is lost. 94.9 per cent of 1,074 firms are founded with a legal form of limited
liability (see Table 2). Firms founded with other legal forms have a very low
                                          
8  The government becomes committed as a silent partner in new firms assisted the BTU program,
Germany’ largest federal program to promote venture capital activities in early stage, subjected
to a venture capitalist involvement as lead investor.
9  Only 60 percent of all start-ups being founded since 1999 are recorded for the first time by
Creditreform by January 2001. Therefore, the analysis focuses on new firms with a foundation
date between 1991 and 1998 to avoid selection problems inside the cohorts.14
probability of receiving venture capital. Involvements in those firms are mostly
organized as silent partnerships. Silent partnerships are inconsistent with evaluating
the active role of venture capitalists in their portfolio firms. Hence, for evaluating
the impact of venture capital funding on the growth of new firms, only firms with
the legal form of limited liability (GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, AG) are taken into
account. 
< Table 2 about here >
5  Results
All investments which are started in maximum three years old firms are defined as
early stage investments. Hence, 777 of 1,074 firms count as venture-backed firms.
Only 632 of those are considered in the estimation because some missing values in
the important variable “size” are evident. A growth rate can be calculated for 339
venture-backed firms. Venture-backed firms without a growth rate are mostly
founded in 1997 and 1998. Those firms are seldom recorded twice by Creditreform
until January 2001 with a minimum distance of six months between inquiry dates.
Table 3 shows large growth differences between venture-backed and non-venture-
backed firms. Venture-backed firms in high-tech industries achieve 42 per cent
annual employment growth rates. Unlike them, non-venture backed firms realize
only 14 per cent. An unreported common t-test emphasizes significant differences
between the means. Smaller differences are obvious for both groups in low-tech
industries. The most impressive result is that the median of employment growth
rates for venture backed firms differs from zero. However, growth rates vary
dramatically for the group of venture-backed firms. The high standard deviation of
growth rates results from the high risk of failure as well as a lot of chances for
success. 15
< Table 3 about here >
Pre-investment screening procedure, provided services and monitoring by venture
capitalist seems to affect new firm employment growth positively. However, this
observation does not allow a causal interpretation as a positive impact of venture
capitalist’ role during the time of venturing on growth. It’s unclear whether the
positive impact results from venture capitalist activities during the time of venturing
or whether the impact is based on firm characteristics before venture’s beginning.
Evaluating the impact during the time of venturing is only possible if effects
resulting from the pre-investment screening procedure are excluded. The discussed
econometric selection approach is one way to realize that. Table 4 presents the
results based on this approach.10 For getting the final specification, an unrestricted
model with a differentiation between high-technology and low-technology industries
is estimated firstly. A common variable for both industries is used if no significant
differences in variables between high-tech and low-tech industries are observed and
the likelihood ratio test shows no significant deterioration of the model. 
< Table 4 about here >
Columns 2 and 3 contain the estimation results for the growth equation with
observed involvement of venture capitalists as endogenous variable in the growth
equation. Columns 4 and 5 are the counterparts and present results for observed
involvement of other external firms as an endogenous variable in the growth
equation. The reported results of the Heckman’s two step estimator with bivariate
selection rule can be interpreted exactly as though growth rates are observable for all
                                          
10  Bootstrapping of standard errors is in use to overcome the Heckman’s two-step estimator
obstacle of inconsistent standard errors. I take the STATA 7.0 procedure with 100 iterations to
calculate them. The interpretation of coefficients is not affected by using bootstrapped standard
errors because only small changes are obvious in comparison to inconsistent standard errors.
Hence, results for bootstrapped standard errors are not reported.16
firms because potential biases derived from  2 N observations without growth rate are
considered in the selection equation. 
First, I comment the effects of two possible selections for biased results. Significant
negative correlations between the error terms in the growth equation and selection
equation in both models are evident (see coefficient for  ev  ). This result suggests a
downward bias: Hence, firms with bad conditions, lower or negative growth rates
are more often surveyed by Creditreform and over-represented in the sample.
Following from this, average growth rates reported in Table 3 are smaller than in
reality because fast-growing firms are under-represented. Furthermore, significant
negative correlations are obvious between error terms of the growth equation and the
involvement equation in both models (see coefficient for  eu  ). The result can be
interpreted as though a negative impact of unobservable characteristics on the
probability of receiving venture capital finance and involvement of external firms
respectively, as well as on employment growth exist. The correlation coefficient
between the involvement equation and selection equation is also negative in both
models (see  uv   in Table 5). That means, unobservable factors reduce the probability
of calculating a growth rate if a high probability of the involvement of venture
capitalist or external firms is obvious. Summarizing, the consideration of both
selection rules, the selection biases derived from observations without growth rate
and the selection biases derived from the screening procedure prepared by venture
capitalists is necessary for the general validity of the results. A simplification of the
trivariate structure of the model would lead to biased results. 
The coefficient of the variable “Involvement of venture capitalist” measures the
impact of venture capitalists’ financial involvement, provided services and
monitoring during the time of venturing on new firm growth after excluding effects
of pre-investment screening. The analysis shows that firms respectively in high-tech
(low-tech) industries achieve 165 (177) per cent points higher annual average
employment growth rates if they receive venture capital. The results confirm the first17
hypothesis not only for the common contribution of venture capitalists but also for
the contribution in the second stage. The positive impact is in contrast to the
observations of Manigart and Hyfte (1999) and Buergel et al. (2000). They do not
note any significant impact. The explicit consideration of two possible selection
rules, the use of different approaches and considerable differences in the number of
observations are potential sources for this difference in results. 
The impact of venture capital finance on new firm growth is larger compared to the
results of Engel (2001a). One important reason for the differences is that Engel
(2001a) used a statistical matching procedure to find a most suitable non-venture-
backed twin for each venture-backed firm which does not differ in important initial
founding characteristics. The calculated causal effect is based on a comparison of
growth rates between the group of venture-backed firms and the control group of
non-venture backed firms. In addition I took the matching procedure into account
only for firms which are still market-active. As expected the partial effect is lower
when I do the same in the econometric selection approach. Now, venture backed
firms in high-tech (low-tech) industries achieve 110 (114) per cent higher growth
rates in relation to the group of non-venture backed firms with a similar amount of
business activities. Furthermore, selection biases resulting from firms without
growth rates and the impact of unobservable determinants of venture capital finance
are considered by using the Heckman’s two-step estimator in this study. Differences
in the strength of the effect are also observed by Almus (2001). He also found a
stronger impact of public start-up assistance on new firms growth by using
Heckman’s two-step estimator in comparison to results of a statistical matching
procedure.
On the contrary to the second hypothesis, significant differences between high-tech
and low-tech industries are not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The
result suggests that venture capitalists’ role is independent from firm’s affiliation to
a high-tech industry and probably not solely based an technological characteristics.18
However, it is remarkable that the use of firm’s individual innovation level can lead
to other results. 
The coefficient of the variable “Involvement of other external firms” measures the
impact of links to external firms. The origin of those links is also endogenous
because on the one hand not only every firm needs or is interested in links to
external firms and not every firm is a suitable candidate for external firm’s
involvement. Links to external firms positively support firms’ development.
Moreover, firms in high-tech industries can gain more from the knowledge transfer
and the reduction of financial constraints as a result of the involvement of external
firms. Results show furthermore that involvement of venture capitalists in new firms
during the time of venturing is more successful compared to the impact on the new
firm’s growth resulting from links with other external firms. Similarly the
contribution of venture capitalists is three times above the impact of other external
firms. 
The robustness of estimation results is also tested. A reduction of the time lag
between the beginning of the involvement and the foundation date to a maximum
length of 24 months shows comparable results. The higher risk of finance leads to a
greater amount of provided services by venture capitalist in early stages. This and
because of focussing on analyzing growth of surviving firms the impact of venture
capital finance and of other involvements is larger. Results are also robust against
changes to specification and outliers. Both models are estimated separately for high-
technology and low-tech industries. The results are very similar to the observations
of common models. 
Finally, some initial founding characteristics as critical factors of growth are
included in the estimations and are discussed briefly. Those are frequently in
accordance with the predictions. Smaller firms realize higher growth rates (Sutton
1997). Hence, Gibrat’s Law of proportional growth is rejected for small firms.
Firm’s age is negatively correlated with growth rates. The thesis that new firms have19
to grow up very fast in early years (Jovanovic 1982) is confirmed by this variable.
Dependent foundations and public limited companies achieve higher growth rates.
Lower financial constraints offer advantageous conditions for growth in these firms.
Diversified firms and team foundations achieve higher growth rates. Moreover, the
environment of foundation location has some impact on firms’ growth and is in
accordance with the predictions. The number of employees in the same branch
measures the effects of localization of the same industries (according to the two or
three digit codes) and is positively related to firms’ growth. On the contrary to
expectations, regions with a large number of R&D employees in manufacturing
seem to offer some disadvantageous conditions for new firm development. Growth
rates of new firms are significantly smaller in those regions. Possibly, variable also
measures the negative impact of agglomerations, because largest R&D centres are
located in the biggest German cities. A positive impact of technological knowledge
concentrated at universities on firm growth is evident only for firms in low-tech
industries. Those firms in regions with a large number of scientific staff at public
R&D institutes achieve smaller growth rates.
The estimation results from the involvement equations show some interesting facts
(see Table 5). The results are in accordance with the predictions about the key role
of some firm-specific, founder-specific characteristics as well as the firm’s
environment. Start-ups founded between 1995 and 1998 have a significantly higher
probability of receiving venture capital finance than start-ups founded in earlier
years. This finding was expected owing to a considerable increase of early stage
funding by venture capitalists since the establishment of the “Neuer Markt“ in 1997.
Firms in industries with a high innovation level receive more often venture capital in
comparison with the reference group of firms with business activities in real estates.
Team foundations and male-dominated firms are also preferred by venture
capitalists. A team of founders with management activities is more able to overcome
business difficulties because potential individual know-how deficits may be
compensated (Storey 1994). Information about firms with a significant amount of20
business activities are up-to-date, because they are more often surveyed by
Creditreform. The probability of receiving venture capital is higher for those firms
compared to the other ones. New firms with business activities in growing
industries, measured by the change of the number of foundations between the
foundation year and 1999, are also preferred by venture capitalists. Investors
frequently tend to look for firms in R&D intensive regions and urban centres
because the probability of finding an interesting project is higher in those regions.
New venture-backed firms are more often established near institutions of Helmholtz-
Society and in urban centres. The average size of the Helmholtz-Societies is
dramatically larger compared to other public-R&D institutions. This fact allows one
to that a higher probability for commercial exploitation of new technologies is
connected with a higher probability for venture capital funding. Hence, a stronger
importance compared to other R&D-institutions is not surprising. The most
important fact is that the involvement of a venture capitalist is a positive signal for
other investors, customers and suppliers. Frequently, links with other firms increase
the probability of receiving venture capital.
6  Summary
The paper empirically tests some hypotheses about the role of the venture capitalist
in the growth of new German firms. The ZEW Foundation Panels are the database
which contains firm specific data provided by the largest German credit rating
agency Creditreform. The definition of a German venture-backed firm is based on
searches for investment activities of venture capitalists in newly founded firms
recorded in the database. Venture capitalist involvement in new firms is accepted
when the investment takes place in start-ups with a maximum age of three years. All
new firms founded between 1991 and 1998 with a legal form of limited liability are
considered. Moreover, only those five-digit codes are included when at least one
firm in this digit-code received venture capital. 21
Most hypotheses about the (short term) impact of venture capital can be confirmed
on the basis of the results of a descriptive analysis and the use of econometric
analysis tools. Our econometric selection approach suggests the consideration of two
possible selection rules for getting unbiased results. Firms receiving venture capital
achieve significantly higher growth rates owing to financial involvement and
services provided by venture capitalists. In accordance with the predictions, venture
capitalists are more able to push the firms to a faster and higher growth than other
investors during the time of venturing. Venture-backed firms achieve 170 per cent
points higher growth rates. In comparison to that, firms with links to other external
investors achieve only 50 per cent points higher employment growth. Venture
capitalists are more profit oriented and therefore especially interested in fast-
growing firms in order to realize their expected revenues in a short time. In
comparison to that, external firms are more interested in increasing the monopoly
power and/or getting a comparative technological advantage by strategic ventures in
newly established firms. 
Venture capital finance is especially suitable to finance projects with a lot of
uncertainty and information asymmetries, because the selection of firms with a high
potential for growth and the impact during the time of venturing is most successful.
At the moment the number of venture-backed firms in Germany is still very small.
The positive impact shown is supposed to make a contribution to the increasing
adoption of venture capital finance as an additional financial resource for
entrepreneurs when financial constraints are obvious. Venture-backed firms can use
the involvement of venture capitalists as well as the involvement of other investors
as a signal for a firm which is performing well in contacts with suppliers, customers
and partners. Moreover, the involvement of venture capitalists is affected by the
involvement of other external firms as investors. In this paper the impact of venture
capital funding on short-term growth of surviving firms is examined. An interesting
question for further studies is whether venture-backed firms achieve a sustainable22
medium and long-term growth and whether results are the same if non-surviving
firms are included. 
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Appendix
Table 1: Definition of High-technology industries 




services in natural sciences
642, 722, 723, 724, 726, 731
R&D intensive manufacturing  2233, 233, 2411-2414, 2417, 242, 243, 244, 2461-2464, 2466,
291, 293, 294, 2952-2956, 296, 300, 322, 323, 311, 314, 315,
3162, 321, 331, 332, 333, 334, 341, 343, 352, 353
Hardware, technical consulting  721, 725, 742, 743 
Non-technical consulting,
advertising 
732, 741 without 7415, 744
Low-technology industries
Other manufacturing  15...37 without digit codes of high-technology industries
Health services, Recrational,






Traffic, Renting of equipment,
sewage and refuse disposal, other
business-oriented services 
60-64, 745-748 without 7415 and 74847, 90, 
Construction 10-14, 40, 45
Wholesale trade 51 without 51641
Wholesale and retail trade of
hard- and software, office
machinery equipment
51641, 52484
Sale, maintenance and repair of
vehicles, retails trade
50, 52 without 52484
Source: Grupp and Legler (2000), own differentiation.25





backed firms related to
the number of new







services in natural sciences 
1)
219 1.10 20.39
R&D intensive manufacturing 
1)  128 1.22 11.92
Hardware, technical consulting 
1)  58 0.18 5.40
Non-technical consulting, advertising 
1) 90 0.26 8.38
Other manufacturing  98 0.34 9.12
Health services, Recrational, cultural,
sporting activities, other consumer-
oriented services
45 0.17 4.19
Real estate activities, Credit/Insurance 113 0.13 10.52
Traffic, Renting of equipment, sewage
and refuse disposal, other business-
oriented services 
51 0.13 4.75
Construction 36 0.04 3.35
Wholesale trade 115 0.19 10.71
Wholesale and retail trade of hard- and
software, office machinery equipment
55 0.27 5.12
Sale, maintenance and repair of
vehicles, retails trade
56 0.04 5.21
Missing  10 0.13 0.93
Sum 1,074 0.18 100.00
Legal form 
Sole proprietorship  2 0 0.19
Private limited and unlimited
partnership (BGB-Gesell., OHG, KG)
53 0.08 4.93
Private limited partnership with limited
liability company as general partner
(GmbH & Co. KG)
172 0.72 16.01
Limited liability or public limited
company (GmbH, AG)
847 0.42 78.86
Sum 1,074 0.18 100.00
Time-lag between begin of venture
capitalist’ involvement and
foundation date 
At foundation date  194 - 18.06
<=12 months  311 - 28.96
>  12...24 months 183 - 17.04
>  24...36 months 125 - 11.64
>  36...48 months 83 - 7.73
>  48...60 months 55 - 5.12
>  60...72 months 39 - 3.63
>  72 months 84 - 7.82
Sum 1,074 - 100.00
Remark: The identification of venture-backed firms founded between 1991 and 1998 is based on
cumulative information in the database until January 2001. To calculate the shares in column 3 only five-
digit codes are considered with a minimum absolute number of one venture-backed firm. The definition of
industries according to Table 1, 
1) High-tech industries.
Source: The ZEW-Foundation Panels (2001). 26
Table 3:  Observed Annual Average Employment Growth Rates
Group of firms Observations Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Venture-backed firms in high-tech
industries
154 41.5% 29.8% 0.5819
Non-Venture backed firms in
high-tech industries
19,061 14.2% 0 0.3763
Venture backed firms in low-tech
industries
185 27.7% 9.9% 0.6081
Non-venture-backed firms in low-
tech industries
76,171 10.1% 0 0.3627
Remark: The observed growth rate is based on 95,571 observations considered in growth equations. 
Sources: The ZEW-Foundation Panels (2001). 
Table 4:  Estimation results for growth equations
Evaluating the impact of
venture capitalists in
Evaluating the impact of

















1 2 3 4 5
Involvement of venture capitalists   1.654**   1.772**   0.221**   0.135** 
 (0.184)   (0.211)   (0.044)   (0.042) 
Involvement of other firms after foundation  0.076**   0.047**   0.525**   0.486** 
 (0.015)   (0.007)   (0.043)   (0.039) 
Dependent foundation  0.05**   0.024**   0.062**   0.031** 
 (0.008)   (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.004) 
Ln(Size)  -0.258**   -0.261** 
 (0.004)   (0.004) 
Ln(Size) * Ln(Size)   0.042**   0.041** 
 (0.001)   (0.001) 
Ln(Age)   -0.044**   -0.05** 
 (0.003)   (0.003) 
Limited Partnership with limited liability  0.003   0.011*   0.01   0.014** 
company as general partner (Gmbh & Co. KG)  (0.011)   (0.005)   (0.011)   (0.005) 
Public limited company (AG)  0.103**   0.109** 
 (0.022)   (0.022) 
Diversified  0.014**   0.013** 
 (0.002)   (0.002) 
Team Foundation   0.035**   0.032** 
 (0.002)   (0.002) 
Female and male Founder(s)  0   0.009 
 (0.005)   (0.005) 
Female Founder(s) only  -0.022**   -0.013** 
 (0.004)   (0.004) 27
Table 4 continued 
Evaluating the impact of
venture capitalists in
Evaluating the impact of

















1 2 3 4 5
County’s Population Density (ln)  0   0.001 
 (0.001)   (0.001) 
Distance to the nearest science park (ln)  -0.004**   -0.004** 
 (0.001)   (0.001) 
Employees in the same branch at a maximum   0.006*   0.015**   0.005   0.016** 
Distance of 50 km (ln)  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
R&D employees in manufacturing   -0.006**   -0.011**   -0.005*   -0.011** 
At a maximum distance of 50 km (ln)  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001) 
Scientific staff at universities/universities   0.002   0.003**   0.001   0.003** 
Of applied science in engineering/natural
science at a maximum distance of 50 km (ln)
 (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001) 
Scientific staff at other public R&D institutes   0   -0.001*   0.001   -0.001* 
in engineering/natural science at a maximum
distance of 50 km (ln)
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
East Germany  -0.001   -0.002 
 (0.007)   (0.007) 
Constant  0.441   0.438** 
 (0.016)   (0.016) 
eu   -0.551**   -0.174** 
 (0.069)   (0.018) 
ev   -0.121**   -0.134** 
 (0.007)   (0.006) 
Number of Observations (N) 95,571 95,571
R² 0.1321 0.1326
F-test for industry differences F (k-1, N-K)
- Involvement of venture capitalists (1, 95498) 3.06 2.06
- Involvement of external firms (1, 95498) 3.33 5.75*
F-test for common significance F (k-1, N-K)
- Federal States (13, 95498) 13.25** 15.42**
- Industries (Two-Digit-Codes) (30, 95498) 36.49** 38.82**
** significant on the 1%-level, 
* significant on the 5%-level.  eu  and  ev   are estimates of the bivariate
probit models in Table 5.
Sources: The ZEW-Foundation Panels (2001), BBR, own estimations.28
Table 5:  Estimation results for bivariate probit models 




Ln(Size) 0.094** 0.016 0.134** 0.006
Limited Partnership (Gmbh & Co. KG) 0.229** 0.041 ------------ ------------
Public limited company (AG) 0.304** 0.090 0.305** 0.05
Involvement of venture capitalists ------------ ------------ 0.607** 0.069
Involvement of other firms after foundation 0.37** 0.047 ------------ ------------
Dependent foundation 0.293** 0.036 ------------ ------------
Team Foundation 0.058 0.032 0.089** 0.011
Female and male Founder(s) -0.318** 0.079 -0.254** 0.023
Female Founder(s) only -0.337** 0.078 -0.205** 0.02
Information is up-to-date  0.165** 0.031 0.145** 0.01
Software, Communications, R&D services  0.547** 0.056 0.033 0.025
R&D intensive manufacturing  0.553** 0.065 -0.141** 0.029
Hardware, technical consulting  0.105 0.073 -0.136** 0.022
Non-technical consulting, advertising  0.15* 0.064 -0.053* 0.022
Other manufacturing  0.31** 0.065 -0.19** 0.022
Health services, consumer-oriented services 0.137 0.078 -0.011 0.026
Traffic, other business-oriented services  0.062 0.069 -0.046* 0.021
Construction -0.257** 0.079 -0.383** 0.019
Wholesale trade 0.168** 0.058 -0.118** 0.018
Wholesale and retail trade of hard- and software  0.183* 0.089 -0.09** 0.033
Sale, repair of vehicles, retails trade -0.044 0.072 -0.308** 0.02
Founded in 1992  0.042 0.079 -0.13** 0.017
Founded in 1993  0.079 0.078 -0.278** 0.02
Founded in 1994  0.073 0.079 -0.401** 0.022
Founded in 1995  0.188* 0.078 -0.473** 0.026
Founded in 1996  0.186** 0.067 -0.119** 0.02
Founded in 1997  0.412** 0.062 -0.122** 0.02
Founded in 1998  0.479** 0.063 -0.291** 0.022
County’s Population Density (ln) 0.083** 0.016 -0.006 0.006
Distance to the nearest science park (ln) 0.001 0.016 -0.007 0.005
Dist. to the n. university/univ. appl. science (ln) -0.009 0.017 -0.017** 0.006
Dist. to the n. institute of Fraunhofer-Society  -0.017 0.016 -0.003 0.006
Dist. to the n. institute of Helmholtz-Society -0.078** 0.014 -0.013* 0.005
Market potential in East Germany  0.134** 0.052 -0.457** 0.048
Market potential in West Germany 0.1** 0.037 -0.084** 0.018
Level of debt  0.026 0.014 0.019** 0.004
Brandenburg 0.127 0.079 0.176** 0.021
Bavaria  0.156** 0.041 -0.266** 0.018
Constant -3.901** 0.221 -1.563** 0.07429
Table 5 continued 
Selection equation  Existence of the average annual growth rate (1/0)
Ln(Size)  0.17** 0.010 0.164** 0.01
Ln(Size) * Ln(Size) -0.042** 0.003 -0.039** 0.003
Founded in 1992  0.144** 0.012 0.084** 0.013
Founded in 1993  0.331** 0.015 0.206** 0.015
Founded in 1994  0.467** 0.017 0.307** 0.017
Founded in 1995  0.63** 0.020 0.398** 0.021
Founded in 1996  0.213** 0.013 0.093** 0.013
Founded in 1997  0.424** 0.016 0.216** 0.017
Founded in 1998  0.433** 0.018 0.152** 0.02
Limited Partnership (Gmbh & Co. KG) -0.098** 0.012 -0.16** 0.012
Public limited company (AG) -0.281** 0.039 -0.315** 0.039
Involvement of venture capitalists  0.189** 0.017 0.557** 0.019
Involvement of other firms after foundation 0.124** 0.010 -0.03** 0.011
Dependent foundation 0.25** 0.024 -0.052* 0.026
Diversified 0.071** 0.007 0.064** 0.007
No complaint  w. respect to payment behaviour 0.538** 0.017 0.532** 0.017
Prompt payment of invoices 1.063** 0.020 1.041** 0.02
Payment within term of payment 0.822** 0.010 0.806** 0.01
Payment sometimes out of term of payment 0.911** 0.016 0.895** 0.016
Payment takes longer, slowly  1.064** 0.020 1.054** 0.019
Impending insolvency 1.031** 0.013 1.022** 0.013
Distance to the next community (≥ 50,000 pop.) -0.004 0.020 0.01 0.02
County’s Population Density (ln) -0.026** 0.005 -0.06** 0.005
Constant 0.522** 0.113 1.452** 0.114
uv  -0.05* 0.020 -0.288** 0.008
Number of observations  186,347 186,347
- nonzero outcomes in the involvement equation 632   10,559
- nonzero outcomes in the selection equation 102,210   102,210
Log-Likelihood -120,934.65 -154,632.44
Wald Test   df
2  : specification (235) resp. (233) 20,727.85** 24,734.52**
LR Test   df
2 
- Federal States (14)  303.31** 263.48**
- Industries (30) 3,295.71** 3,164.03**
- Creditreform Societies (131) 1,585.21** 1,708.08**
** significant on the 1%-level, 
* significant on the 5%-level. The selection equation contains dummies for
both industries and German federal states. The indicator variables for the Creditreform Societies
measure variation concerning inquiries about firms and are considered in the selection equation.
Sources: The ZEW-Foundation Panels (2001), BBR, own estimations.30
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Source: Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), Goux and E. Maurin (2000).